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Tort Law. Laprocina v. Lourie, 250 A.3d 1281 (R.I. 2021). The
Rhode Island Supreme Court decided an issue of first impression
on the question of whether a utility owes a duty to private individuals to maintain streetlights. In Rhode Island, a public utility generally owes no common law duty to individual third parties who are
allegedly injured, at least in part, as a result of inoperable streetlights.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On December 30, 2010, a motor vehicle owned by Christine
Lourie and driven by Nicole Lourie struck a pedestrian, George
Laprocina (Laprocina), while he was attempting to cross Allens Avenue at Toronto Avenue in Providence, Rhode Island.1 Laprocina
suffered multiple bodily fractures, severe head trauma, and permanent brain damage from the collision.2
In 2013, Laprocina’s estate, plaintiff, commenced a negligence
action in Superior Court against Narragansett Electric Company
(Narragansett), arguing that the place of the collision was not
properly lit at the time because Narragansett allowed a “rolling
blackout” to occur, or failed to repair, replace, and maintain the
streetlights in the area of the collision.3
Narragansett argued to the contrary that it owed no duty of
care to Laprocina because a tariff approved by the R.I. Public Utilities Commission (PUC streetlight tariff) governed its duty to maintain the streetlights at the intersection, which limited any duty
owed by Narragansett solely to its customer, the City of Providence
(City).4 In 2014, Narragansett moved for summary judgment on

1. Laprocina v. Lourie, 250 A.3d 1281, 1283 (R.I. 2021).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1284.
4. Id. See R.I.P.U.C. No. 2031-A: Narragansett’s “duties and obligations
under this tariff extend only to the city, and not to any third parties.”
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the basis that it was immune from liability pursuant to the liability
disclaimer contained in the tariff.5
A hearing on Narragansett’s first motion for summary judgment was held on February 9, 2016.6 The trial justice denied Narragansett’s motion, finding that the liability disclaimer contained
in the tariff was unenforceable because it was overly broad and contrary to public policy by allowing coverage even for cases of willful
or wanton misconduct.7
In 2018, Narragansett filed a second motion for summary judgment, arguing that under principles of common law negligence and
contract law, it had no duty to Laprocina to maintain the streetlight
at the intersection.8 A new trial justice heard the motion and applied the factors outlined in Banks v. Bowen’s Landing Corp.9 for
whether a common law duty exists.10 The trial justice concluded
that under the Banks test, Narragansett did not owe a duty of care
to Laprocina.11 Laprocina’s estate timely appealed from the judgment.12
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The Court divided its analysis into three parts: (1) whether the
judgment violated the law of the case doctrine, (2) whether a duty
existed under the PUC streetlight tariff, and (3) whether a duty existed under common law.13 Under the law of the case doctrine, “after a judge has decided an interlocutory matter in a pending suit, a
second judge, confronted at a later stage of the suit with the same
question in the identical manner, should refrain from disturbing

5. Laprocina, 250 A.3d at 1284.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. 522 A.2d 1222 (R.I. 1987).
10. Laprocina, 250 A.3d at 1284. The Banks factors are “(1) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; (2) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered an injury; (3) the closeness of connection between the defendant’s conduct
and the injury suffered; (4) the policy of preventing future harm; and (5) the
extent of the burden to the defendant and the consequences to the community
for imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach.” See
Banks, 522 A.2d at 1225.
11. Laprocina, 250 A.3d at 1284.
12. Id.
13. Laprocina, 250 A.3d at 1283–90.
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the first ruling.”14 The Court held that Narragansett’s second motion for summary judgment was based on different grounds from
the first motion because the second motion relied upon a common
law duty whereas the first relied upon a liability disclaimer in the
PUC streetlight tariff.15 Therefore, the second justice was not confronted with “the same question in the identical manner” and the
law of the case doctrine did not apply.16
With regard to the question of Narragansett’s duty under the
PUC streetlight tariff, the Court found that its duty to repair streetlights only extended to the City and not to the general public.17 The
plaintiff asserted that the PUC streetlight tariff and the City’s ordinances created a duty and claimed that there was a “concerted
partnership” between the City and Narragansett to report and repair streetlights.18 However, the Court found that the tariff does
not impose any affirmative duty upon Narragansett to conduct inspections in order to ensure the functionality of streetlights.19 Rather, the tariff placed the responsibility on the City to notify Narragansett of any inoperable streetlights.20 The Court found that
the City has the duty to inspect the streetlights, and not Narragansett.21 Therefore, the Court held that Narragansett owes no duty
under the PUC streetlight tariff to individual third parties who are
allegedly injured as a result of inoperable streetlights.22
With respect to the question of duty under common law, the
Court found that Narragansett owed no duty to Laprocina.23 The
Court found that a majority of jurisdictions have held that “pedestrians injured in motor vehicle accidents allegedly caused, at least
in part, by inoperative streetlights could not recover from the utilities that maintained the streetlights.”24 The Court cited the
14. Id. at 1285. See Lynch v. Spirit Rent-A-Car Inc., 965 A.2d 417, 424 (R.I.
2009) (quoting Chavers v. Fleet Bank (RI), 844 A.2d 666, 677 (R.I. 2004)).
15. Laprocina, 250 A.3d at 1285.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1286. See R.I.P.U.C. No. 2031-A: “The city is responsible for notifying [Narragansett] of inoperable lamps.”
18. Laprocina, 250 A.3d at 1286.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1287.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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reasoning of the California Court of Appeals, which found that imposing a duty on the utilities for vehicular collisions would be an
undue burden because of the cost in increased utility rates, the high
likelihood that streetlights will become periodically inoperable, the
low likelihood that an inoperable streetlight will cause a collision
given the prevalence of headlights, and the availability of insurance
to cover the costs.25
The Court found that there is no bright-line rule in Rhode Island for determining whether a legal duty exists; rather, the determination must be made on a case-by-case basis.26 Expanding on
the Banks factors, the Court used a broad common law duty test
that considered “all relevant factors, including the relationship of
the parties, the scope and burden of the obligation to be imposed
upon the defendant, public policy considerations, and notions of
fairness.”27 Therefore, under this broad common law balancing
test, and given the persuasive rationale of the majority of jurisdictions evidenced by the California Court of Appeals, Narraganset’s
burdens from liability here greatly outweighed the injured plaintiff’s sought-after compensation.28
Furthermore, the Court reasoned that it “declined to find a
duty when an injury occurred on property not owned or controlled
by the defendant.”29 The Court found that Narragansett “does not
own, control, or maintain the subject area; rather, the city has exclusive ownership and control of its public streets.”30 The decedent,
furthermore, “had no special or direct relationship with

25. Id. at 1288. See White v. S. California Edison Co., 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431,
434, 437 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that utility owed no contractual or common law duty to moped driver injured in a collision that occurred at an intersection where streetlights were not functioning.)
26. Laprocina, 250 A.3d at 1288.
27. Id. at 1288–89 (citing Carlson v. Town of South Kingstown: 131 A.3d
705, 709 (R.I. 2016) (quoting Woodruff v. Gitlow, 91 A.3d 805, 814 (R.I. 2014).
28. Laprocina, 250 A.3d at 1289.
29. Id. (citing Wyso v. Full Moon Tide, LLC, 78 A.3d 747, 751 (R.I. 2013)).
30. Laprocina, 250 A.3d at 1289. The City’s public service engineer inspects electrical fixtures within the City and is vested with “the general control
and supervision of all public lights used by the city for illuminating its streets,
highways, parks and public places.” PROVIDENCE, R.I., CODE § 23-136 (2019);
see id. § 23-125.
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Narragansett.”31 And if Narragansett were to be held liable to third
parties for streetlight malfunction, it would “be required to alter its
business operations by inspecting, maintaining, and replacing
thousands of streetlights on hundreds of streets in the city.”32 The
cost of this new mandate would result in a substantial burden on
the public utilities.33 Consequently, the Court held that a public
utility generally owes no common law duty to individual third parties who are allegedly injured, at least in part, as a result of inoperable streetlights.34
COMMENTARY

Under Section 7 and Section 37 of the Restatement (Third) of
Torts, an actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care
when the actor’s conduct creates a risk of physical harm.35 However, an actor whose conduct has not created a risk of physical harm
to another has no duty of care to the other.36 The Restatement
analysis applied here, therefore, turns on whether the public utility
created a risk of physical harm to the pedestrian through its actions
in allegedly failing to maintain a streetlight. The Court reasoned
that there is only a “slight chance that a single inoperative streetlight will be the cause of a motor vehicle collision.”37 Therefore, the
likelihood of an inoperable streetlight creating a risk of physical
harm is minimal.
The Court reasoned that from a public policy perspective this
low risk of physical harm is greatly outweighed by the burden that
tort liability would place on public utilities. That is, the driver of a
vehicle in a vehicular collision under an inoperable streetlight is in
a better position to assume the liability because of the high likelihood that streetlights will become periodically inoperable, the low
likelihood that an inoperable streetlight will cause a collision given
31. Laprocina, 250 A.3d at 1289. The decedent was a member of the public
who was a pedestrian but had no special or direct relationship with Narragansett. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1289–90.
35. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARM § 7, 37 (AM. L. INST. 2010).
36. Id.
37. Laprocina, 250 A.3d at 1289 (quoting White, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 437).
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the prevalence of headlights, and the availability of insurance to
cover the costs. Imposing a duty on the public utility for vehicular
collisions would thus be an undue burden. The undue burden would
consist of the cost in increased utility rates when the public utility
externalized the cost to the public. The Court, in essence, applied
Learned Hand’s liability formula and found that the high burden to
the defendant to avoid the harm and the low likelihood that the
harm will occur offsets the risk of the magnitude of the injury.38
Therefore, the complaint failed the common law duty balancing test
because the defendant’s burden greatly outweighed the plaintiff’s
likelihood of injury.
On the other hand, between the driver and the utility, the utility may be the cheapest cost-avoider because it would likely know
how long streetlights last and when to reasonably expect them to
go out.39 According to the cheapest cost-avoider theory, the utility
could be in the best position to most efficiently cure the harm upstream by setting up a program that will timely maintain inoperable lights downstream. If so, the duty should attach because the
utility would be the cheapest cost-avoider with an incentive to reduce the plaintiff’s severe risk of death. But this position assumes
that such a system of maintenance is feasible, accurate, and reasonably priced. Furthermore, a minority of jurisdictions have reasoned to the contrary that streetlights are particularly important
for pedestrian safety because drivers can see pedestrians from farther away with streetlights than with mere headlights.40
The Court made the correct holding in this case, halting what
could become a floodgate of litigation against the public utilities, an
increase the cost of utility bills, and a perverse incentive on the defendant to not provide streetlights so as to avoid liability. The
Court thus determined that the public utilities generally owe no
common law duty to individual third parties who are allegedly injured, at least in part, as a result of inoperable streetlights because
38. For Learned Hand formula, B=PL, see United States v. Carroll Towing
Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
39. For an explanation of the cheapest cost-avoider theory, see Stephen G.
Gilles, Negligence, Strict Liability, and the Cheapest Cost-Avoider, 78 V.A. L.
REV. 1291 (1992).
40. For this rationale, see Clay Electric Co-op., Inc. v. Johnson, 873 So. 2d.
1182 (Fl. 2003) (holding that the injured pedestrian has adequately shown that
the utility assumed a specific, legally recognized duty to act with due care in
maintaining the streetlight).
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(1) the likelihood of risk of harm from an inoperable streetlight is
minimal given car headlights; (2) the defendant’s burden greatly
outweighed the plaintiff’s likelihood of injury; (3) the plaintiff failed
to prove either an employer-employee relationship or sufficient control of the subject area to establish the defendant’s common law
duty; and (4) the plaintiff’s harm was not foreseeable to the defendant.
CONCLUSION

In an issue of first impression to the Rhode Island Supreme
Court, the Court held that a public utility generally owes no common law duty to individual third parties who are allegedly injured,
at least in part, as a result of inoperable streetlights. The Court
reasoned that the common law duty balancing test weighed in favor
of the utilities because imposing a duty on the utilities for failure to
maintain streetlights would constitute an undue burden.
Jeffrey Prystowsky

